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Text of Findings on C.I.A.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 6—Following is the text of the conclusions of the final report of the Senate Intelligence Committee on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the text, D.C.I. is the Director of Central Intelligence, D.D.I. is the Directorate for Intelligence, D.D.O. is the Directorate for Operations and N.S.C. is the National Security Council.

The C.I.A. was conceived and established to provide high-quality intelligence to senior policymakers. Since 1947 the agency—its structure, its place within the Government and its function—has undergone dramatic change and expansion. Sharing characteristics common to most large, complex organizations, the C.I.A. has responded to rather than anticipated the forces of change; it has accumulated functions rather than redefining them; its internal patterns were established early and have solidified; success has come to those who have made visible contributions in high-priority areas. These general characteristics have affected the specifics of the agencys development.

The notion that the C.I.A. could serve as a coordinating body for departmental intelligence activities and that the D.C.I. could orchestrate the process did not take into account the inherent institutional obstacles posed by the departments. From the outset no department was willing to concede a centralized intelligence function to the C.I.A. Each insisted on the maintenance of its independent capabilities to support its policy role. With budgetary and management authority vested in the departments, the agency was left powerless in the execution of interdepartmental coordination. Even in the area of coordinated national intelligence estimates the departments did not readily provide the agency with the data required.

It was not until John McCone's term as D.C.I. that the agency aggressively sought to assert its position as a coordinating body. That effort demonstrated the complex factors that determined the relative success of community management. One of the principal influences was the support accorded the D.C.I. by the President and the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense. In a situation where the D.C.I. commanded no resource or outright authority, the position of these two individuals was crucial. While Kennedy and McNamara provided McCone with consistent backing in a variety of areas, Nixon and Laird failed to provide Helms with enough support to give him the necessary bureaucratic leverage.

Lack of Coordination

It is clear that the D.C.I.'s own priorities, derived from their backgrounds and interests, influenced the relative success of the agency's role in interdepartmental coordination. Given the limitations on the D.C.I.'s authority, only by making community activities a first order concern and by pursuing the problems assertively could a D.C.I. begin to make a difference in effecting better management. During Allen Dulles' term interagency coordination went neglected, and the results were expansion of competing capabilities among the departments. For McCone, community intelligence activities were clearly a priority, and his definition of the D.C.I.'s role contributed to whatever advances were made. Helms' fundamental interests and inclinations lay within the agency, and he did not push his mandate to its possible limits.

The D.C.I.'s basic problems have been competing claims on his time and attention and the lack of real authority for the execution of the central intelligence function. As presently defined, the D.C.I.'s job is burdensome in the extreme. He is to serve the roles of chief intelligence adviser to the President, manager of community intelligence activities, and senior executive in the C.I.A. History has demonstrated that the job of the D.C.I. as community manager and as head of the C.I.A. are competing, not complementary roles. In terms of both the demands imposed by each function and the expertise required to fulfill the responsibilities, the two roles differ considerably. In the future separating the functions with precise definitions of authority and responsibilities may prove a plausible alternative.

Although the agency was established primarily for the purpose of providing intelligence analysis to senior policymakers, within three years clandestine operations became and continued to be the agency's pre-eminent activity. The single most important factor in the transformation was policymakers' perception of the Soviet Union as a worldwide threat to United States security. The agency's large-scale clandestine activities have mirrored American foreign policy priorities. With political operations in Europe in the 1950's, paramilitary operations in Korea, Third World activities, Cuba, Southeast Asia, and currently narcotics control, the C.I.A.'s major programs paralleled the international concerns of the United States. For nearly two decades American policymakers considered covert action vital in the struggle against international Communism. The generality of the definition or "threat perception" motivated the continual development and justification of covert activities from the senior policymaking level to the field stations. Apart from the overall anti-Communist motivation, successsive Presidential administrations regarded covert actions as a quick and convenient means of advancing their particular objectives.

Incentive System Criticized

Internal incentives contributed to the expansion in covert action. Within the agency D.D.O. careerists have traditionally been rewarded more quickly for the visible accomplishments of covert action than for the long term development of agents required for clandestine collection. Clandestine activities will remain an element of United States foreign policy, and policymakers will directly affect the level of operations. The prominence of the Clandestine Service within the agency may moderate as money for and high-level executive interest in covert actions diminish. However, D.D.O. incentives which emphasize operations over collection and which create an internal demand for projects will continue to foster covert action unless an internal conversion process forces a change.

In the past the orientation of D.C.I.s such as Dulles and Helms also contributed to the agency's emphasis on clandestine activities. It is no coincidence that of those D.C.I.s who have been Agency careerists, all have come from the Clandestine Service. Except for James Schlesinger's brief appointment, the agency has never been directed by a trained analyst. The qualities demanded of individuals in the D.D.O.—essentially management of people—serve as the basis for bureaueractic skills in the organization. As a result, the agency's leadership has been dominated by D.D.O. careerists.

Clandestine collection and covert action have had their successes, i.e., individual activities have attained their stated objectives. What the relative contribution of clandestine activities has been—the extent to which they have contributed to or detracted from the implementation of United States foreign policy and whether the results have been worth the risk—cannot be evaluated without wide access to records on covert operations, access the committee did not have.

Organizational arrangements within the agency and the decision-making structure outside the agency have permitted the extremes in C.I.A. activity. The ethos of secrecy which pervaded the D.D.O. had the effect of setting the directorate apart within the agency and allowed the Clandestine Service a measure of autonomy not accorded other directories. More importantly, the compartmentation principle allowed units of the D.D.O. freedom in defining operations. In many cases the burden of responsibility fell on individual judgments—a situation in which lapses and deviations are inevitable. Previous excesses of drug testing, assassination planning and domestic activities were supported by an internal structure that permitted individuals to conduct operations without the consistent necessity or expectation of justifying or revealing their activities.

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'Blurred Accountability'

Ultimately, much of the responsibility for the scale of covert action and for whatever abuses occurred must fall to senior policymakers. The decision-making arrangements at the N.S.C. level created an environment of blurred accountability which allowed consideration of actions without the constraints of individual responsibility. Historically the ambiguity and imprecision derived from the initial expectation that covert operations would be limited and therefore could be managed by a small, informal group. Such was the intention in 1948. By 1951 with the impetus of the Korean war, covert action had become a fixed element in the U.S. foreign policy repertoire. The frequency of covert action forced the development of more formalized decision-making arrangements. Yet structural changes did not alter ambiguous procedures. In the late 1950's the relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles allowed informal agreements and personal understandings to prevail over explicit and precise decisions. In addition, as the scale of covert action expanded, policymakers found it useful to maintain the ambiguity of the decision-making process to insure secrecy and to allow "plausible deniability" of covert operations.

No one in the executive—least of all the President—was required to formally sign off on a decision to implement a covert action program. The D.C.I. was responsible for the execution of a project but not for taking the decision to implement it. Within the N.S.C. a group of individuals held joint responsibility for defining policy objectives, but they did not attempt to establish criteria placing moral and constitutional limits on activities undertaken to achieve the objectives. Congress has functioned under similar conditions. Within the Congress a handful of committee members passed on the agency's budget. Some members were informed of most of the C.I.A.'s major activities; others preferred not to be informed. The result was twenty-nine years of acquiescence.

At each level of scrutiny in the National Security Council and in the Congress a small group of individuals controlled the approval processes. The restricted number of individuals involved as well as the assumption that their actions would not be subject to outside scrutiny contributed to the scale of covert action and to the development of questionable practices.

Independent Development

The D.D.O. and the D.D.I. evolved out of separate independent organizations. Essentially, the two directorates functioned as separate organizations. They maintain totally indepedent career tracks and once recruited into one, individuals are rarely posted to the other.

In theory the D.D.O.'s clandestine collection function should have contributed to the D.D.I.'s analytic capacity. However, D.D.O. concerns about maintaining the security of its operations and protecting the identity of its agents, and D.D.I. concerns about measuring the reliability of its sources restricted interchange between the two directorates. Fundamentally, this has deprived the D.D.I. of a major source of information. Although D.D.I.-D.D.O. contact has increased during the last five years, it remains limited.

The D.D.I. has traditionally not been informed of sensitive covert operations undertaken by the D.D.O. This has affected the respective missions of both directorates. The Clandestine Service has not had the benefit of intelligence support during consideration and implementation of its operations. The Bay of Pigs invasion was an instance in which D.D.I. analysts, even the Deputy Director for Intelligence, were uninformed, and represents a situation in which timely analysis of political trends and basic geography might have made a difference—either in the decision to embark on the operation or in the plans for the operation. In the D.D.I., lack of knowledge about operations has complicated and undermined the analytic effort. Information on a C.I.A.-sponsored political action program would affect judgments about the results of a forthcoming election; niformation provided by a foreign government official would be invaluable in assessing the motives, policies, and dynamics of that government; information on a C.I.A.-sponsored propaganda campaign might alter analyses of the press or public opinion in that country. Essentially, the potential quality of the finished intelligence product suffers.

Duplication a Problem

The agency was created in part to rectify the problem of duplication among the departmental intelligence services. Rather than minimizing the problem the agency has contributed to it by becoming yet another source of intelligence production. Growth in the range of American foreign policy interests and the D.D.I.'s response to additional requirements have resulted in an increased scale of collection and analysis. Today, the C.I.A.'s intelligence products include: current intelligence in such disparate areas as science, economics, politics, strategic affairs and technology; quick response to specific requests from government agencies and officials; basic or long-term research, and national intelligence estimates. With the exception of national intelligence estimates other intelligence organizations engage in overlapping intelligence analysis.

Rather than fulfilling the limited mission in intelligence analysis and coordination for which it was created, the agency became a producer of finished intelligence and consistently expanded its areas of responsibility. In political and strategic intelligence the inadequacy of analysis by the State Department and by the military services allowed the agency to lay claim to the two areas

As the need for [illegible] the D.D.I. responded—as the [illegible] for objective national intelligence. Over time the D.D.I. has addressed itself to a full range of consumers in the broadest number of subject areas. Yet the extent to which the analysis satisfied policymakers' needs and was an integral part of the policy process has been limited.

The size of the D.D.I. and the administrative process involved in the production of finished intelligence—a process which involves numerous stages of drafting and review by large numbers of individuals—precluded close association between policymakers and analysts, between the intelligence product and policy informed by intelligence analysis. Even the national intelligence estimates were relegated to briefing papers for second and third level officials rather than the principal intelligence source for senior policymakers that they were intended to be. Recent efforts to improve the interaction include creating the N.I.O. system and assigning two fulltime analysts on location at the Treasury Department. Yet these changes cannot compensate for the nature of the intelligence production system itself, which employs hundreds of analysts, most of whom have little sustained contact with their consumers.

Reciprocal Relationship

At the Presidential level the D.C.I.'s position is essential to the utilization of intelligence. The D.C.I. must be constantly informed, must press for access, must vigorously sell his product and must anticipate future demands. Those D.C.I.'s who have been most successful in this dimension have been those whose primary identification was not with the D.D.O.

Yet the relationship between intelligence analysis and policymaking is a reciprocal one. Senior policymakers must actively utilize the intelligence capabilities at their disposal. Presidents have looked to the agency more for covert operations than for intelligence analysis. While only the agency could perform covert operations, decision-making methods determined Presidential reliance on the C.I.A.'s intelligence capabilities. Preference for small staffs, individual advisers, the need for specialized information quickly—all of these factors circumscribe a President's channel of information, of which intelligence analysis may be a part. It was John F. Kennedy who largely determined John McCone's relative influence by defining the D.C.I.'s role and by including McCone in the policy process; it was Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon who limited the roles of Richard Helms and William Colby. Although in the abstract objectivity may be the most desirable quality in intelligence analysis, objective judgments are frequently not what senior officials want to hear about their policies. In most cases, Presidents are inclined to look to the judgments of individuals they know and trust. Whether or not a D.C.I. is included among them is the President's choice.

Over the past 30 years the United States has developed an institution and a corps of individuals who constitute the U.S. intelligence profession. The question remains as to how the institution and the individual will best be utilized.

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